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Abstract
The Porter Hypothesis postulates that the costs of compliance with environmental
standards may be offset by adoption of innovations they trigger. We model this hypoth-
esis using a game of timing of technology adoption. We show that times of adoption are
earlier the higher the non-adoption tax. The environmental tax turns the preemption
game with low profits into a game with credible precommitment yielding high prof-
its (pro-Porter). If there is a precommitment game without environmental taxes, the
introduction of a tax leads to lower profits (anti-Porter).
Keywords: Environmental Policy, Strategic Trade Theory,
Technology Adoption, Porter Hypothesis
JEL: Q2, F1, H7, O3
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1 Introduction
The environmental Porter Hypothesis suggests (see Porter and van der Linde, 1991,
1995a, 1995b) that the costs of compliance with environmental standards may be par-
tially or even fully offset by innovations they trigger. This may even lead to absolute
advantages over foreign competitors. In their article geared to policy makers and man-
agers, they state:
“If innovation in response to environmental regulation can be profitable —
if a company can actually offset the cost of compliance through improving
resource productivity — why is regulation necessary at all? [...]
[T]he belief that companies will pick up on profitable opportunities without
a regulatory push makes a false assumption about competitive reality —
namely, that all profitable opportunities for innovation have already been
discovered, that all managers have perfect information about them, and that
organizational incentives are aligned with innovating.” (1995b, p. 127)
Since the general fear of trade economists was one of ecological dumping rather than
increased environmental regulation to improve competitiveness, the article was greeted
with skepticism. Nevertheless, it led economists to think seriously about the gist of
the Porter Hypothesis: Is it possible that firms could gain advantage over their foreign
rivals through tougher environmental regulation? While classical trade theory offers no
reason to believe in the Porter Hypothesis, imperfect competition models were considered
promising to find some theoretical foundations to the case study and anecdotal evidence
offered by Porter and van der Linde.
Ulph (1996a) constructs a Brander-Spencer type of strategic trade model with Cournot
competition. Firms can invest in technology affecting variable costs but not the accom-
panying pollution. He shows that the strategic interaction between producers reduces
the government’s incentive to loosen environmental regulation. He concludes, though,
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that the reduction of pollution with the lowering of the variable costs could change that
result. This is the avenue that Simpson and Bradford III (1996) pick up. They model
the firms in a similar fashion, with the exception that R&D not only lowers marginal
costs, but also the emission of the pollutant. The government uses eﬄuent taxation to
maximize the domestics firm’s profits net of the environmental externalities of produc-
tion. The government is able to force the firm into a Stackelberg-leader position relative
to its foreign competitor. For some special cases of specifications and numerical param-
eter values they are able to construct a strengthening of regulation resulting in a shift
of profits from foreign to domestic firms. However, they stress that this is not a general
result and it is unlikely that environmental regulation should be used as a policy device
to induce industrial advantage. Greaker (2003) models the Porter Hypothesis by assum-
ing that due to the abatement technology the environment is an ‘inferior input’ in the
production process. For some ranges of environmental taxation, this is shown to increase
competitiveness. However, the impact on profits remains ambiguous. Feess and Tais-
tra (2001) model a two-period game with Cournot competition. The environmentally
friendly technology is assumed to lead to a decrease of unit costs in the second period,
however not in a way that reduces overall costs. Policy agencies of the foreign nation are
assumed to stochastically imitate the national environmental regulation. Bertrand-type
imperfect competition models were introduced in the context of strategic environmental
trade policy in the paper by Barrett (1994). In the context of cost saving research Ulph
(1996b) shows both for environmental taxation and for environmental standards that
firms can benefit from tighter regulation if only the governments act strategically, but
firms do not.
Principal-agent models of the Porter Hypothesis are set in the context of organizational
inefficiencies. In this model type incentives between principal and agent over the choice of
projects are miss-aligned. Environmental regulation helps to re-align the preferences of
principal and agent, hence increases the efficiency of the firm (see for example Schmutzler
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(2001) and Klein and Rothfels (1999)). Ambec and Barla (2002) show that, by reducing
agency costs, an environmental regulation may enhance pollution-reducing innovation
while at the same time increasing firms’ private benefit.
Other specifications are e.g. Mohr (2002): he uses a general equilibrium framework
with a large number of agents, external economies of scale in production, and discrete
changes in technology. As new technologies are modeled with an industry learning curve,
firms are stuck in a non-innovating equilibrium, initially. Environmental regulation
enforces the adoption of ‘new technology’, hence allowing for subsequent learning.
Related is Hu¨bner (2001). Using a duopoly model of a patent race, she shows that
stricter environmental policy might increase the probability of a sleeping patent instead
of encouraging environmental technological progress, but the reversed case is also possi-
ble: environmental policy may activate otherwise sleeping patents.
Empirical support for the Hypothesis is based on case study evidence (see Ayres
(1994), Porter and van der Linde (1995a)). Ayres (1994) describes the some cases in the
utilities and the chemical industry. On the other hand Palmer, Oates and Portney (1995)
provide empirical arguments explaining why full offsets are rather unlikely. They base
their argument on information provided by entrepreneurs and find no direct evidence
for the workings of the Porter Hypothesis. A problem with both of these types of infor-
mation provision is that the costs of innovation precede the returns and the returns are
often stretched out over decades. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) critically evaluate the Porter
Hypothesis, they attempt to empirically ‘test’ the Hypothesis, but find no evidence sup-
porting it. This empirical evaluation is based on the link between the stringency of
environmental regulation and R&D, but not on adoption.
Our approach differs from earlier approaches to capture the Porter Hypothesis in
that we explicitly model the timing choice of both the home and foreign firm based on
asymmetries in environmental taxation (regulation). The timing of adoption aspect of
the Porter Hypothesis has not been captured in formal theory so far. We try to make a
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first attempt in this paper using the model of technology adoption of Reinganum (1981),
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985, 1987).
One point we want to make is that environmental policy may destroy a non-adoption
equilibrium. It explains why it may be rational not to adopt, although no opportunities
are overlooked. In a static game of technology adoption (Tirole 1988, Chapter 10) with
environmental taxation it can be shown that a sufficiently high environmental tax can
force firms out of a non-adoption equilibrium. However, this falls short of the Porter
Hypothesis which implies a ‘competitive’ advantage for the nation that introduces the en-
vironmental regulation. In the static environment, the increased competitiveness cannot
be reached. If one country introduces environmental regulation that forces the ‘home’
firm out of a static non-adoption equilibrium, the other firm would follow immediately.
We use a dynamic model of a game of timing with a case of small environmental taxes
turning a preemption game into one of precommitment, therefore, providing a model of
the Porter Hypothesis. Thus, the Porter Hypothesis is rejected in as far as the claim is
one of increasing overall profits through environmental taxes in general. However, the
introduction of a small tax ensures that the home firm would win a preemption game
with certainty. This establishes an order of adoption and therefore a precommitment
situation which yields higher profits for home than in the preemption game, which would
have taken place without the tax. If there is a precommitment game without the taxes,
their introduction would reduce profits.
2 Environmental taxes in a game of timing
In static models of technology adoption firms either both adopt or not at all even if
only one country raises a tax. A less extreme distinction can be considered. Reinganum
(1981) and the extension by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) provide such a model where
firms either adopt earlier or later. We apply the model to the case of environmental
regulation in the spirit of the Porter Hypothesis. This allows to theoretically evaluate
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the hypothesis, as we allow for dynamic effects which are crucial in the argumentation
leading towards an increased competitiveness.
Here we restate their model for the case of two firms and introduce an environmental
non-adoption tax, τ .1 We show that all times of adoption — preemption, following and
joint late adoption — are earlier the higher the adoption tax. Moreover, an environ-
mental tax ensures a precommitment position for the domestic firm. But it decreases
profits when increased further. A low environmental tax ensures a preemptive position
of the domestic firm, establishes an order of adoption, and therefore leads also to a
precommitment associated with higher profit, for the home firm.
2.1 Games of Timing: National Case
Let pi0(0) - τ denote after-tax profits of a firm if no firm has yet adopted. pi0(1) - τ
denotes after-tax profits of a firm if only the other firm has adopted. pi1(1) is the profit
of a firm which has adopted but the other firm has not. pi1(2) is the profit of a firm if
both have adopted.2
There is a cost c(t) associated with adoption, where c is a function of time such that
early adoption is more costly ( c′ < 0).3 Using index 2 for the firm that is second to
adopt, the follower, and index 1 for the leader, the value of the firms with adoption
times T1 and T2 can be written as follows (the first T on the LHS denotes the firms own
adoption time, the second the other firms adoption time):
V 1(T1, T2) =
∫ T1
0
[pi0(0)− τ ]e
−rtdt+
∫ T2
T1
pi1(1)e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
T2
[pi1(2)]e
−rtdt− c(T1)
1
τ could also be introduced by using country specific cost functions, however our purposes treating it
as a separate “cost” serves our purpose best.
2The number in brackets is the number of firms that has adopted: 0, 1, or 2. The lower index 1 (0)
indicates that a firm has (not) adopted.
3The cost of adoption, c(t), is defined to be the present value of adopting the new technology at time t.
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V 2(T2, T1) =
∫ T1
0
[pi0(0)− τ ]e
−rtdt+
∫ T2
T1
[pi0(1)− τ ]e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
T2
pi1(2)e
−rtdt− c(T2)
Firms only differ in two aspects. First, in the second phase firm 1 has adopted and
firm 2 has not. Second, the present value of the cost of adoption, c, at different points
in time are different. Assumptions made on the magnitude of the profit and cost items
are the following:
1. There are decreasing returns in the rank of adoption: pi1(1) > pi1(2).
2. The difference in profits from adoption, at time zero, is not larger than the decrease
in the costs of adopting while waiting: pi1(1) − [pi0(1) − τ ] ≤ −c
′(0) for all τ ≥ 0.
Therefore immediate adoption is not profitable unless the equality part of the
equation holds.
3. Second adoption always becomes profitable after some time:
inft{c(t)e
rt} < {pi1(2)− [pi0(1)− τ ]}/r for all τ ≥ 0.
4. Current costs of adoption are falling but decreasingly so:
for all t, (c(t)ert)′ < 0, (c(t)ert)′′ > 0.
In the national case both firms operate under non-adoption tax. We will develop
the optimal timing of adoption in the case of a national competition first, i.e. where
both firms are faced with the same environmental regulation and taxation. In the next
subsection this will be changed to the international case in which only the home firm
is faced with environmental taxation. The derivations of the optimal timings can be
applied to the international case by setting the the foreign firm’s tax equal to zero.
Precommitment allows a firm to commit to being either follower or leader. However
in order for precommitment to matter it has to be credible. We will argue below that
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the environmental tax will eventually allow the firm to credibly precommit.4 Given pre-
commitment on the order of adoption, the optimal adoption time for the leader, T1, can
be found from the first-order condition
dV 1/dT1 = [pi0(0)− τ ]e
−rT1 − pi1(1)e
−rT1 − c′(T1) = 0 (2.1)
The optimal adoption time for the follower in case of a precommitment can be found
from the first-order condition
dV 2/dT2 = [pi0(1)− τ ]e
−rT2 − pi1(2)e
−rT2 − c′(T2) = 0. (2.2)
If the leader has already adopted, the second of the two equations determines the
followers optimal time, T ∗2 . Note that this is the optimal timing for the follower with
and without precommitment. It allows us to calculate the impact of the environmental
tax on the followers optimal adoption time:
dT ∗2
dτ
= −
−e−rT2
[pi0(1)− τ ](−r)e−rT2 + rpi1(2)e−rT2 − c′′(T2)
= −
−e−rT2
−rc′(T2)− c′′(T2)
< 0
(2.3)
The second equation has been obtained by insertion of c′ from equation (2.2). As-
sumption (4) implies that the denominator, which is also the second-order condition of
equation (2.2), has a negative sign.
The dependence of timing of the leader upon the environmental tax can be derived in
a similar fashion:
4See propositions 2.6 and 2.8.
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dT ∗1
dτ
= −
−e−rT1
[pi0(0)− τ ](−r)e−rT1 + rpi1(1)e−rT1 − c′′(T1)
= −
−e−rT1
−rc′(T1)− c′′(T1)
< 0
(2.4)
This leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1 The leader and the follower adopt earlier under precommitment if the
environmental tax is larger.
If there is no precommitment on the order of adoption, firms may be interested in
preemption. The timing of preemption can be found as follows. The leader’s payoff if
she succeeds in preempting at time t is
L(t) =


V (t, T ∗2 ) if t < T
∗
2
V (t, t) if t ≥ T ∗2
The followers payoff if he is preempted at time t is:
F (t) =


V (T ∗2 , t) if t < T
∗
2
V (t, t) if t ≥ T ∗2
If both firms adopt together the payoff for each firm is M(T ) = V (t, t).
If t < T ∗2 , L(t) > M(t) and F (t) > M(t). Using the above definitions as in equations
(2.1) and (2.2) one finds that
[L(t)− F (t)]′ = −pi1(1)e
−rT1 − c′(T1) + [pi0(1)− τ ]e
−rT1 = 0 (2.5)
[L(t)− F (t)]′′ = −rc′ − c′′ < 0 (2.6)
because of assumption (4). As L(t) − F (t) has a maximum, each firm would like to
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preempt the other. As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) , L(0) < F (0) from assump-
tion (2) and L(T ∗2 ) = F (T
∗
2 ) from the definitions of L and F and L(T
∗
1 ) > F (T
∗
1 ) from
V 1(T ∗1 , T
∗
2 ) > V
2(T ∗2 , T
∗
1 ) under precommitment. Together with the monotonicity of the
value functions this information implies that there must be a point in time, T1, at which
L(T1) = F (T1) (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985, p. 386). This is the first profitable
point in time for preemption. Equating the values of the firms, V 1,2, for this point in
time yields
L(T1)− F (T1) =
∫ T2
T1
pi1(1)e
−rtdt− c(T1)−
{∫ T2
T1
[pi0(1)− τ ]e
−rtdt− c(T2)
}
= 0 (2.7)
Proposition 2.2 Under preemption, the timing of preemptive adoption will be earlier
if the environmental tax is higher.
This follows from equation (2.7) which implies:
dT1
dτ
= −
∫ T2
T1
e−rtdt
−pi1(1)e−rT1 + [pi0(1)− τ ]e−rT1 − c′(T1)
< 0.
Now suppose that there is joint late adoption and therefore
M = V 1 = V 2. Insertion of the value functions given above for T1 = T2 yields
M = V 1,2(T2, T1) =
∫ T1
0
[pi0(0)− τ ]e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
T2
pi1(2)e
−rtdt− c(T2)
The optimal joint adoption time is found by maximization of M with respect to T =
T1 = T2. The first order condition is
dM
dT
= [pi0(0)− τ ]e
−rT − pi1(2)e
−rT − c′(T ) = 0
From this we can calculate the impact of an increase in the environmental tax on the
timing of joint adoption:
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Table 1: Payoff in the game of timing
Foreign
lead follow
lead (Lh, Lf ) (Lh, F f )
Home
follow (F h, Lf ) (F h, F f )
dT
dτ
= −
−e−rT
−r[pi0(0)− τ ]e−rT + rpi1(2)e−rT − c
′′(T )
< 0
Proposition 2.3 Joint late adoption takes place earlier under a higher environmental
tax.
2.2 Games of Timing: International Case
Now let us suppose that the environmental regulation is one-sided. The firms are lo-
cated in different countries. Firm 1 is located in ‘Home’, while firm 2 is located in
‘Foreign’, competing on a third market without transport costs or tariffs. Foreign does
not introduce any environmental regulation.
Table 1 summarizes in general terms the payoff for the firms. Now pi0(0)− τ are after-
tax profits of the home firm and pi0(0) for the foreign firm if no firm has yet adopted.
pi0(1) − τ are after-tax profits of the home firm if only the other firm has adopted and
pi0(1) for the foreign firm. pi1(1) is the profit of the home firm which has adopted but
the other, foreign firm has not. pi1(2) is the profit of either firm if both have adopted.
We use upper indices ‘h’ and ‘f ’ for home and foreign respectively. Let us first examine
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the case in which the home firm is precommitted to be the follower. In this case:
F h ≡ V hF (T
h
2 , T
f
1 ) =
∫ T f1
0
[pi0(0)−τ ]e
−rtdt+
∫ Th2
T
f
1
[pi0(1)−τ ]e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
Th2
pi1(2)e
−rtdt−c(T h2 )
(2.8)
And for the foreign, precommitted leader, we have:
Lf ≡ V fL (T
f
1 , T
h
2 ) =
∫ T f1
0
pi0(0)e
−rtdt+
∫ Th2
T
f
1
pi1(1)e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
Th2
pi1(2)e
−rtdt−c(T f1 ) (2.9)
Given that home follows, we can determine the optimal adoption time:
T h2 :
∂V hF
∂T2
= [pi0(1)− τ ]e
−rTH2 − pi1(2)e
−rTH2 − c′(TH2 ) = 0 (2.10)
We can see that TH2 (r, τ) is independent of T1. Further,
∂TH2
∂τ
< 0. Hence we can state
that:
Proposition 2.4 Home, as the follower, adopts earlier if the environmental tax is
larger, decreasing the time that a foreign firm can reap the benefits of early adoption.
Examining the impact of the environmental tax, τ , on the timing of the foreign leader
we find:
T f1 :
∂V fL
∂T f1
= pi0(0)e
−rT
f
1 − pi1(1)e
−rT
f
1 − c′(T f1 ) = 0 (2.11)
Hence, T f1 is independent of τ and T
H
2 . The timing of foreign leadership is not affected
by the tax τ imposed by the home government.
Let us now turn to the case in which home is precommitted leader and foreign is follower:
F f ≡ V fF (T
f
2 , T
h
1 ) =
∫ Th1
0
pi0(0)e
−rtdt+
∫ T f2
Th1
pi0(1)e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
T
f
2
pi1(2)e
−rtdt− c(T f2 )
(2.12)
11
- time
T ∗h1 T
∗f
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∗h
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∗f
2
Figure 1: Timing of adoption under precommitment
Lh ≡ V hL (T
h
1 , T
f
2 ) =
∫ Th1
0
[pi0(0)− τ ]e
−rtdt+
∫ T f2
T
h
1
pi1(1)e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
T
f
2
pi1(2)e
−rtdt− c(T h1 )
(2.13)
Again, we can determine the optimal timing of T2, given that foreign is committed to
follow.
T f2 :
∂V fF
∂T f2
= pi0(1)e
−rT
f
2 − pi1(2)e
−rT
f
2 − c′(T f2 ) = 0 (2.14)
Once more, the timing of the foreign firm’s adoption, here T f2 , is independent of τ , but
also of the timing of early adoption T h1 . Further note that, T
H
2 < T
f
2 , because (2.10)
and (2.14) differ only by τ in (2.10).
For the timing of home, as the precommitted leader, we get:
T h1 :
∂V hL
∂T h1
= [pi0(0)− τ ]e
−rTh1 − pi1(1)e
−rTh1 − c′(T h1 ) = 0 (2.15)
Note that the time of adoption is earlier the higher the environmental tax:
∂Th1
∂τ
< 0.
Home, as a leader, adopts faster than foreign as a leader, i.e. T h1 < T
f
1 because of (2.11)
and (2.15).
Proposition 2.5 Foreign adopts slower — given that the environmental tax is smaller
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Table 2: Preferences of the Firm
Foreign
lead follow
Lh − F h > 0, Lh − F h > 0,
lead Lf − F f > 0 Lf − F f < 0
Home
Lh − F h < 0, Lh − F h < 0,
follow Lf − F f > 0 Lf − F f < 0
or equal to zero — than the home firm both as leader and follower
Returns to Leadership and Following
We have shown above, that — under precommitment — home adopts earlier than the
foreign firm, both as a leader and as a follower. Hence, we can order all timing of
adoption in the following way: T h1 < T
f
1 < T
h
2 < T
f
2 , which is also depicted in Figure 1.
We have to make sure, though, that the firms actually want to be leader or follower.
In order to examine this we have to examine the difference between leadership returns
L and follower returns F . Table 2 summarizes the payoff, which will be specified below.
Home would like to lead if Lh−F h ≥ 0 and follow otherwise. Subtracting the maximized
value of (2.8) from (2.13) yields:
L∗h − F ∗h =
∫ T ∗f1
T ∗h1 (τ)
[pi1(1)− pi0(0) + τ ]e
−rtdt+
∫ T ∗h2 (τ)
T
∗f
1
[pi1(1)− pi0(1) + τ ]e
−rtdt
+
∫ T ∗f2
T ∗h2 (τ)
[pi1(1)− pi1(2)]e
−rtdt−
[
c(T ∗h1 (τ))− c(T
∗h
2 (τ))
]
(2.16)
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2.2.1 Preemption
Home will try to preempt as long as L∗h−F ∗h > 0 and being the leader at the preemption
time T yields at least the same revenue as being a follower. At this point the partial
differential of equation (2.7) the first profitable time of preemption with respect to the
height of the tax τ is evaluated:
∂T
h
1
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
Lh(Th
1
)=Fh(T∗h
2
)
= −
(1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
−
∫ Th
1
0
e
−rt
dt
(2)︷ ︸︸ ︷
+
∫ T∗f
1
0
e
−rt
dt
(3)︷ ︸︸ ︷
−[pi0(1)− τ ]e
−rT∗h
2
∂T
∗h
2
∂τ
(4)︷ ︸︸ ︷
+
∫ T∗h
2
T
∗f
1
e
−rt
dt
(5)︷ ︸︸ ︷
+pi1(2)e
−rT∗h
2
∂T
∗h
2
∂τ
(6)︷ ︸︸ ︷
+c
′ ∂T
∗h
2
∂τ
[pi0(0)− τ ]e−rT
h
1 − pi1(1)e−rT
h
1 − c′(Th1 )
The denominator is greater than zero as Lh − F h = 0 is before (in time) the maximum.
We will evaluate the sign of the numerator by the parts indicated with the brackets
above them: The first part (1)
−
[
1
−r
e−rt
]Th1
0
= −
[
1
−r
e−rT
h
1 −
1
−r
]
< 0 as T h1 > 0
has the economic interpretation that the environmental tax reduces the profit of leader-
ship in the first phase, and therefore the first profitable time of adoption is later.
The second part (2) is greater than zero:
∫ T ∗f1
0
e−rtdt =
[
1
−r
e−rt
]T ∗f1
0
=
1
−r
[
e−rT
∗f
1 − 1
]
> 0 as T ∗1 > 0
The tax reduces the follower profit in the first phase, the company has an earlier first
profitable time of adoption.
The 3rd, 5th and 6th term are all zero, as the Envelope Theorem applies to F ∗h and
therefore
∂Th∗2
∂τ
-terms sum to zero and drop out.
The 4th term ensures that
∂Th1
∂τ
< 0, i.e. earlier pre-emption point of time for home
with higher environmental taxation. Hence, the taxation insures that the home firm
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always accepts earlier preemption times than foreign, because taxes guarantee lower
profits as follower, and will thus win preemption games with certainty (rather than with
a 50 percent chance).
Proposition 2.6 A non-adoption tax in one country ensures that the firm in that coun-
try can preempt earlier than the firm in the other country. This establishes the order of
adoption and therefore the precommitment case becomes relevant, where the home firm
get higher profits than in the preemption game.
2.2.2 Joint late adoption
Another possibility is that both firms prefer to defer the investment in the new technol-
ogy, yielding a joint late adoption equilibrium: M(t) = V (t, t).
The value function for foreign will then be:
Mf (t) =
∫ Tˆ1
0
pi0(0)e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
Tˆ1
pi1(2)e
−rtdt− c(t)
The value function for the home firm mirrors that of the foreign firm, with the inclusion
of the environmental tax for the non-adoption time.
Mh(t) =
∫ Tˆ1
0
[pi0(0)− τ ]e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
Tˆ1
pi1(2)e
−rtdt− c(t)
The first order conditions for c(t) are
∂Mf
∂Tˆ1
= pi0(0)e
−rTˆ1 − pi1(2)e
−rTˆ1 − c′(Tˆ1) = 0
= (pi0(0)− pi1(2))e
−rTˆ1 − c′(Tˆ1) = 0
∂Mh
∂Tˆ1
= (pi0(0)− τ − pi1(2))e
−rTˆ1 − c′(Tˆ1) = 0
This environmental tax destroys late adoption, as it leads to earlier adoption than the
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foreign firm, hence destroying the joint late adoption equilibrium.
Proposition 2.7 Even small taxes create a precommitment against (late) joint adop-
tion.
2.2.3 Returns to leadership
The change of ‘leadership returns’ with respect to the environmental tax, τ , for home is
evaluated below. Derivation with respect to T h1 sum up to zero when the envelop theorem
is applied to Lh and those with respect to T h2 when it is applied to F
h. Therefore only
the direct effects matter.
∂(Lh−Fh)
∂τ
=
∫ T f1
Th1 (τ)
e−rtdt+
∫ Th2 (τ)
T
f
1
e−rtdt
=
[
−1
r
e−rt
]T f1
Th1
+
[
−1
r
e−rt
]Th2
T
f
1
= − 1
r
[
e−rT
f
1 − e−rT
h
1
]
− 1
r
[
e−rT
h
2 − e−rT
f
1
]
= − 1
r
[
e−rT
h
1 − e−rT
h
2
]
> 0
A higher non-adoption tax increases the desire to lead, because it reduces profits from
followership, F h, more than from leadership, Lh. Similarly, the foreign firm would like
to lead if Lf − F f ≥ 0.
Lf − F f =
∫ T f1
Th1
[pi0(0)− pi0(1)]e
−rtdt+
∫ Th2
T
f
1
[pi1(1)− pi0(1)]e
−rtdt
+
∫ T f2
Th2
[pi1(2)− pi0(1)]e
−rtdt− [c(T f1 )− c(T
f
2 )]
(2.17)
Now the effect of the ‘home tax’ on foreigns willingness to lead (or follow), is captured
in the following derivative:
∂(Lf − F f )
∂τ
= −[pi0(0)− pi0(1)]e
−rTh1
∂T h1
∂τ
+ pi1(1)e
−rTh2
∂T h2
∂τ
− pi1(2)e
−rTh2
∂T h2
∂τ
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Figure 2: Timing of Technology Adoption under Pre-commitment
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We cannot fully sign the derivative.5 Therefore we give a numeric simulation in the next
subsection.
2.3 Simulations
The cost function in this numerical simulations will be parameterized as c(t) = 100·e−αt.
The assumption of c′ < 0 and c′′ > 0 are then fulfilled for all economically sensible
parameter values of α ∈ R+. The parameter α can be interpreted as one of technological
advancement lowering the cost of adoption over time.
We have parameterized the profits after innovation using an additional parameter x in-
dicating the increase in profits through the new technology, denoting long-run advantage
of the new technology. Note that this advantage is lasting even after the follower has also
adopted. For the different parameter values that we have tried, refer to Table 3.6 In case
3, we find the possibilities for preemption and precommitment. In the other case there is
no case of preemption because the short-run gain is too low. In the simulation that we will
discuss extensively in this section, case 3, we set the interest rate to be r = 0.04, and the
5A large pi0(1) makes the desire to lead weaker, because it gives a higher weight to the timing shift
effect. But a larger pi2(1) has opposing effects directly and from equation (2.3).
6The parameter values presented in the table give the most relevant variations for this simulation
exercise. We have tried other parameter values who confirm the results we present here.
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Table 3: Simulation Parameters and Results
Case pi0(1) pi0(0) pi1(2) pi1(1) α r z · c Result
1 1.9 2 2 + x 2.2 + x 0.2 0.04 100c precommit
2 1.9 2 2 + x 2.2 + x 0.1 0.04 200c precommit
3 1.9 2 2 + x 3.1 + x 0.1 0.04 100c preempt or precommit
4 1.9 2 2 + x 2.2 + x 0.1 0.04 100c precommit
cost decrease of adopting the new technology over time to be α = 0.1. The returns gross
of adoption costs we assume are pi0(1) = 1.9, pi0(0) = 2,≤ pi1(2) = 2+x < pi1(1) = 3.1+x.
In words, being a follower decreases the profits by five percent, whereas the (temporary)
leader gains more than fifty percent in the short run plus some value x = pi1(2)− pi0(0)
gross of cost of adoption in the long run. This value of x remains after the follower
has caught up and also implemented the new technology. Setting x to zero thus would
indicate that — at least in terms of profits — no advantage of adoption would remain.
The timing of technology adoption can be calculated both for given (precommitted)
leadership and followership according to equations (2.10, 2.11, 2.14, and 2.15). Figure
2 plots the timing of adoption for various levels of x or y ≡ x+ τ for foreign and home
respectively. The inner line plots the timing given a firm’s precommitment to leading,
the outer line gives the optimal time of adoption given precommitment to follow.
As this figure is based on precommitment, we have to show that firms actually want
to be leader or follower. If, for example, both firms would want to lead, a game of
preemption will occur in which earlier points of times are chosen than those given in
Figure 2. We will deal with preemption further below.
In Figure 3 we plot L − F values for both home and foreign (cf. Equations 2.16 and
2.17) for various levels of x and y ≡ x + τ . L − F is the profit from leading minus
profits from following, hence as long as it is positive, a firm will attempt to be the first
to adopt. The figure graphically illustrates this situation for the home and foreign firm.
The area in which the L−F area is above zero home would like to lead. Areas that are
overlapping between those two figures indicate regions of pre-emption. Note that x has
18
Figure 3: Willingness to lead: L− F
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the interpretation as above, i.e. continued gain in profits through technology, while y is
defined as the sum of x+ τ . For the chosen parameter specification and cost functions,
the 45 degree line of x = y, i.e. no environmental tax, is an overlapping region in which
both home and foreign would like to lead. Hence, preemption would take place by each
firm with fifty percent chance (Fudenberg and Tirole 1987). However, for large τ > 0,
i.e. x < y = x+ τ we can see that both firms are pulled out of the preemption area and
home will be the leader (L − F is positive for the home firm) whereas foreign prefers
to follow (L− F is negative for the foreign firm). Only for small values of x and τ will
preemption take place.
Proposition 2.8 If the short-term gain is large enough to allow for a preemption case,
low environmental taxes induce a preemption game which is certainly won by the home
firm. The foreign firm will not want to play it. The order of adoption being established
there will be a precommitment outcome of the game. High non-adoption taxes induce a
precommitment for the home firm to be the leader directly.
In Figure 4 the “height” gives the first profitable time T of preemption. Note that
the points of time are decreasing for home with the y-axis while they are decreasing for
foreign along the x-axis. Preemption should result with low τ and precommitment with
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Figure 4: Preemption Point of Time
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high environmental taxes τ . In the case of a preemption game, the lower x is (along the
45 degree line) and the higher τ (moving parallel to the y-axis), within the preemption
range, the later will be the first profitable point of preemption for the foreign firm. For
home, higher environmental taxes lead to earlier profitable points of preemption. Hence,
home will have an earlier profitable preemption point of time for any τ > 0, therefore, it
will preempt just before foreign’s first profitable point of preemption (which yields higher
profits than home’s first profitable point, and is sufficient to be the first one to preempt).
We can then calculate the profits of preemption as a function of x and τ . Increasing τ
leads to lower preemption profits. Figure 5 summarizes the profits of home as a function
of x and y = x + τ . The left figure gives the profits as a function of x and y = x + τ .
Profits are increasing along the 45 degree line and an increase in τ will lower the profits
of the firm. This implies that environmental taxation does not lead to higher profits
of the firms in games of preemption. The right part of Figure 5 gives the profits under
precommitment: For small values of x (and τ) an increase in environmental taxation
will lead to lower profits. Under high levels this is reversed. Only in this last case, the
Porter Hypothesis would be supported. However, these high values of y imply negative
adoption times and therefore have to be excluded, which one can show by cutting off
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Figure 5: Home’s Profits for Preemption and Precommitment
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the graph at the value of y at which there is immediate adoption.
Proposition 2.9 Profits under preemption are lower the larger the non-adoption tax
and profits under precommitment are lower for higher taxes.
For all other numerical values which do not violate the assumptions of the model we
found results that are qualitatively identical.
We have shown in this last section that environmental regulation can be beneficial in
the strategic games of timing, to allow the home firm to lead and avoid preemption.
One should bear in mind that this numerical example was contrived and is specific to
the parameter values at hand. Many other scenarios can be thought might be just as
compelling. Nevertheless, we have shown that environmental tax allows for a quicker
adoption, and a longer time of ‘leadership’ under precommitment and a shorter time
of followership in general. Profits of the firm, however, are not higher: Higher taxes
decrease the profits in the first phase of (3.13), induce a longer second phase (T f2 is
unaffected by τ) and a shorter first phase and higher adoption costs. The net effect is
negative.
Corollary 2.10 In case of precommitment under no environmental tax, the introduction
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of a tax decreases profits (anti-Porter). In case of a preemption game under no environ-
mental tax, the introduction of a small tax allows the home firm to win the preemption
game, and thus establishes an order of adoption. This leads to a precommitment case
which assures higher profits of the home firm compared to the preemption game (pro-
Porter).
In essence we have constructed an example of the weak version of the Porter Hypoth-
esis, as firms – maximizing their profits – are pulled out of an equal chance preemption
equilibrium in such a way that the firm constrained by the environmental regulation
adopts earlier with certainty. Competitiveness in the sense of winning a preemption
game is enhanced. Non-environmental as well as environmental welfare is enhanced for
consumers of home, as they get higher quality and cleaner products earlier.
3 Optimal timing
In order to obtain a welfare function we can enhance the profit functions (2.8), (2.9),
(2.12), (2.13) by adding an environmental damage function, −D, consumer benefits, S,
and tax revenues. Tax revenues and payments then drop out. In the simplest case of a
process innovation with no change in consumer benefits we then only have to add the
environmental damage function. Assuming, again for simplicity, that pollution is only
national, then a simple assumption for a damage function is
Dji =
∫ T ji
0
d0e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
T
j
i
d1e
−rtdt with i = 1, 2 , j = h, f
depending on whether the country is the home or the foreign country and is adopting
first or second. d0is the environmental damage per period before adoption and d1 after
the adoption. When taking the time derivatives this will augment the functions (2.10),
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(2.11), (2.14), (2.15) (without tax term) by the term
−(d0e
−rT
j
i − d1e
−rT
j
i )
This term appears where taxes appeared before and have dropped out when canceled
against the revenue term. By implication the old and the new equations are the same
in the special case where
τ = d0 − d1 > 0
In this case the tax would be a Pigouvian policy instrument, not taking into account
strategic interactions between firms or governments. The effect of taking into account
damages then is the same as that of taxes as analyzed above: all adoption times are
earlier then without taking into account taxes or damages respectively. In the Cournot
literature cited above the tax was reduced in the second stage game between govern-
ments because of the strategic interactions. We do not carry out such a second stage
game because it is tractable only in a numerical way anyway and probably not some-
thing that governments can reasonably be expected to do for every adoption problem.
We did show above that a small tax by one government only may be enough to move
the preemption position from a 50/50 chance to one of zero to the home firm. However,
if the tax is increased further profits fall. On the other hand, a higher tax generates an
earlier first-profitable time of adoption and therefore a strategic advantage in a second
stage game. This might give an incentive for governments to put their value above the
Pigouvian one. If both governments decide to have the same tax in a symmetric game,
there is no impact on the first profitable time of adoption. Home must have a slightly
larger tax than foreign, other things equal. The foreign tax can be normalized to unity.
Therefore we concentrated on Porter’s case of a one-sided tax. Our analysis as presented
above, however, is not limited to a Pigouvian tax, but rather can have any value.
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Extending the welfare function for consumer benefits in case of delivery to third mar-
kets only is slightly more complicated. It would imply, in one of the possible models
we could imagine, considering international welfare and therefore the sum of the profit
functions for home and foreign. Consumer benefits then are increased twice, first, when
the first firm adopts and offers a better quality probably at a higher price and, second,
when the second firm adopts and price competition decreases the price of the better
variant. The formal treatment then requires adding consumer benefits
Sji =
∫ T j1
0
s0e
−rtdt+
∫ T j2
T
j
1
s1e
−rtdt+
∫
∞
T
j
2
s2e
−rtdt with j = h, f
to the sum of (2.8) and (2.10) or that of (2.12) and (2.13) using the adequate j, h
or f , after adding the environmental damage function and dropping the tax terms as
above. We leave the exploration of details to the interested reader, noting that it is an
international optimum now, obtained as an enhanced joint profit-maximization problem.
It can serve only as a benchmark but not as a recommendation for any international
institution, because there is no one deciding on technology adoption or cares for consumer
benefits in the sense of this model. A second model we could imagine would be one where
welfare is defined as national profits plus benefits of customers abroad. Then a consumer
benefit function could be written down that is completely symmetric to the damage
function above. The tax term τ would then be replaced by d0− d1− (s0− s1) > d0− d1
in the conditions for optimal timing and the marginal consumer benefit would do the
same as a tax or the marginal damage, that is inducing earlier adoption times.7
7A complication arises here if a customer switches to the foreign competitor after adoption of the home
firm. It is reasonable to assume that this does not decrease the total benefit of the consumers of the
home firm.
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4 Conclusion
Given the prominent role of innovation offsets in the Porter Hypothesis we did prefer
to model it using a framework of technology adoption by Fudenberg and Tirole. In the
stationary version of the model non-adoption is an equilibrium outcome although firms
are profit maximizing.
In our dynamic version of the technology adoption model early adoption is more
costly than late adoption. By implication, immediate adoption cannot be expected
and an equilibrium with time periods where a new technology is not adopted by profit
maximizing firms is a rational outcome.
In the national case, under precommitment on the order of adoption, the leader and
the follower adopt earlier if the environmental tax is larger. Under preemption, the
timing of preemptive adoption will be earlier if the environmental tax is higher. Joint
late adoption takes place earlier under a higher environmental tax.
In the international case, the home country raises a tax but the foreign country does
not. Under precommitment on the order of adoption, if home is the follower it adopts
earlier if the environmental tax is larger, decreasing the time that a foreign firm can reap
the benefits of early adoption. Comparing behavior as follower, foreign adopts slower
than home, because in foreign there is no environmental tax by assumption. If there
is a preemption game, a non-adoption tax in one country ensures that the firm in that
country can preempt earlier than the firm in the other country. The home firm preempts
just before the foreign firm would do. The chance of preemption jumps from 50/50 to
100% for the home country if there is an environmental tax. The case of preemption
will exist under a low environmental tax only if the temporary gains of first adoption
are high relative to the temporary losses of second adoption.
If home wins the preemption game with certainty thanks to the environmental tax,
foreign, foreseeing this, limits itself to following. The resulting game then is one of
precommitment.
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Under high non-adoption taxes or low temporary gains and losses there is a precom-
mitment for home to be the leader anyway. Ex-post profits of the home firm are lower
under precommitment the larger the tax is. In sum, a tax introduces a reduction in ex-
post profits in a precommitment game (anti-Porter), but also turns a preemption game
into one of precommitment, which yields higher profit (pro-Porter).
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